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ABSTRACT  
 
Purpose- The purpose of this paper is to analyse the culture change management 
programme in one UK NHS ambulance service, documenting various perverse 
consequences of the change management and suggest further research implications.  
 
Design/methodology/approach- The paper reviews the literature on ‘culture’ and 
‘culture change’ and identifies several perverse consequences of a culture change 
management programme through an in-depth case study analysis, based on interviews 
with trust staff and policy experts along with non-participant observation. Study was 
given ethical approval by the local NHS research ethics committee. 
 
Findings- Significant negative consequences of the culture change management 
programme in the ambulance service are systematically documented. The paper argues 
that any worthwhile study of organisational culture change management must take into 
account the perverse consequences of such a process and its overall impact on 
employees. 
 
Research limitations/implications- These findings come from detailed investigation 
from only one large ambulance trust in the UK. However they have significant 
implications for the organisational ‘culture-performance’ debate. 
  
Practical implications- The paper draws out several policy and practice implications 
from this empirical study. Any meaningful evaluation of culture change initiatives 
should be seen not only in relation to success in achieving planned objectives, but also 
by keeping in mind negative consequences of culture change programmes. 
 
Social implications- The concept of unintended consequences has a long history in 
organisational theory, but there have been relatively few empirical studies recognising 
the importance of unintended consequences of cultural management efforts. The impact 
of cultural change programmes in different organisational settings, including the 
ambulance service, remains under-researched. 
 
Originality/value - This paper makes an original contribution in identifying and 
systematically documenting the disjuncture between stated and unintended 
consequences of ambulance culture change management programme, which will be of 
value to academics, practitioners and policy makers including theory building. 
 
Key words- ambulance, culture, sub-cultures, culture change, perverse consequences, 
culture-performance link, NHS 
 
Paper type- Case study 
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The negative consequences of culture change management: evidence 
from a UK NHS ambulance service 
 
Introduction and background  
Organisational culture and its management are increasingly being viewed as a necessary 
part of health system reform (Scott et al., 2003; Ferlie and Shortell, 2001). There is a 
growing international interest in using organisational culture as a means to improve 
health care. The Bristol Royal Infirmary case (Kennedy, 2001), the high profile report 
of medical errors in the US (Institute of Medicine, 1999) and the Mid Staffordshire 
NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry (Francis, 2010) have renewed the interest 
surrounding dysfunctional behaviour and self-contained sub-cultures and pressures of 
meeting government targets (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2003). Despite the acknowledged 
significance of organisational culture to the theories and practices of management, the 
complexities and consequences of cultural interventions remain comparatively 
understudied (Diefenbach, 2007; Bititci et al., 2006; Harris and Ogbonna, 1998, 2002). 
Commentators argue that attempts to manage culture are frequently characterised by 
perverse consequences that can impede or even prevent the desired culture change 
(Akroyd and Crowdy, 1990; Legge, 1994). 
 Though the concept of unintended consequences has a long history in 
organisational theory (Merton, 1936; Ridgeway, 1956; Caplow, 1994), there have been 
relatively few studies recognising the importance of unintended consequences of 
cultural management efforts. The impact of cultural change programmes in different 
organisational settings remains an under-researched area (Harris and Obgonna, 1998, 
2002; Diefenbach, 2007; Dingwall and Strangleman, 2005; Dutton et al., 2001). Given 
much of the early literature on culture change is either prescriptive or managerial in 
orientation (see Peters and Waterman, 1982; Deal and Kennedy, 1982), assumptions on 
cultural change recommendations often assume employees as willing agents to such 
management initiatives; without revealing much about the consequences of these 
changes on the employees and the human dynamics (Austin and Currie, 2003). 
Development of scholarship in emergency services, especially the ambulance 
service, is a growing academic endeavour (Wankhade and Murphy, 2012). 
Management research about the nature and role of the ambulance services within the 
wider health economy is a relatively recent phenomena (Heath and Radcliffe, 2007, 
2010; Bevan and Hamblin, 2009). Recent published evidence suggests that some of the 
issues concerning ambulance performance targets and their unintended consequences 
might have their origins in the underlying occupational cultures in the ambulance 
service (see Wankhade, 2011, 2012; Radcliffe and Heath, 2009).  
Despite the methodological and conceptual limitations of any such analysis, the 
exploration of the culture change process with respect to organisational employees in 
the ambulance service is an important topic for academic enquiry.  This will improve 
academic and practitioner understanding of the culture change process in an emergency 
healthcare organisation that has been relatively neglected, notwithstanding the 
abundance of literature on organisational culture. The article addresses this imbalance 
in the literature and will focus on the exploration and documentation of the unintended 
consequences of a cultural management programme in a NHS ambulance trust in the 
UK, evaluating the impact of cultural change on its employees. It is recognised that 
unintended consequences may be positive as well as negative; but in this study it is 
largely perverse outcomes which are identified. 
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This paper is structured as follows. The first section reviews the literature on 
culture and the management of culture, including the unintended consequences of such 
initiatives. Section two discusses the contextual dimension of such change programmes 
for the ambulance service in England in the light of current direction of travel 
(Department of Health, DH, 2005). The third section details the research methodology 
adopted for this study. The fourth section presents evidence about the various 
unintended consequences of the culture change initiatives documented in the study. 
Section five has a discussion and analysis of the findings. This is followed by 
concluding remarks. 
 
Literature review  
Before dealing with managing organisational culture, it will be useful to understand 
what organisational culture is. Defining culture is not easy, and ‘culture’ and ‘culture 
management’ have been the subject of considerable academic debate (Alvesson, 1995; 
Cameron and Quinn, 1999; Martin, 2002; Schein, 1992). Most definitions recognise the 
socially constructed nature of ‘culture’ as a phenomenon that is expressed in terms of 
patterns of behaviour. Allaire and Firsirotu (1984) compare organisations to mini-
societies, highlighting the interpretation and expression of the role of the participants 
within the socio-political and technical world of the organisation. For all the 
disagreements over the precise definition of organisational culture amidst the multitude 
of such definitions available, it is generally agreed that culture operates in layers, and 
Schein’s (1992) view of organisational culture as a ‘layered’ pattern of shared basic 
assumptions manifested in shared values and organisational artefacts is quite popular. 
Though a fuller discussion is beyond the scope of this paper, this pluralist view of 
culture finds support in the literature (see Smircich, 1983; Martin, 1992), but different 
perspectives on studying culture are also available. 
Several studies have suggested that the effectiveness of a wide variety of 
organisations, including healthcare, might be linked with the culture of the organisation 
(Cameron and Freeman, 1991; Wilderom et al., 2000; Davies et al., 2000). While there 
is some intuitive appeal in the proposition that organisational culture may be a relevant 
factor in healthcare performance, the possible relationship between culture and 
performance is not conclusively established since both ‘culture’ and ‘performance’ as 
variables are conceptually and practically distinct (Scott et al., 2003a, b). Mixed 
evidence has been reported from international studies linking culture to organisational 
effectiveness (Mannion et al., 2005; Gerowitz et al., 1996). It has been further argued 
that a major cultural transformation needs to be secured alongside structural and 
procedural change to deliver expected improvements in healthcare performance and 
quality (DH, 2000).  
Cultural change is high on the government agenda and involves all elements of 
cultural and organisational changes. Key aspects include empowering front line staff to 
use their skills and knowledge to develop innovative services, with more say in how 
services are delivered and resources are allocated, and changing the NHS culture and 
structure by devolving power and decision-making to frontline staff led by clinicians 
and local people (DH, 2001a, p. 2). It may not be enough to know whether culture is 
linked to performance, but also to know how and why it is linked. Considerable 
conceptual and empirical work remains to be done to provide better substantiated 
articulation of these links and their implication for healthcare policy and management 
and how cultures can be managed (McNulty and Ferlie, 2002). 
A critical review of literature suggests several distinct strands in relation to 
managing culture. The first approach is that of ‘natural evolution’ whereby new 
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members in an organisation are socialized and inculcated with the organisational 
culture, which is further reinforced as dynamic interaction occurs (Harris and Obgonna, 
2002, p. 33). This model is supported by Sathe (1983) and Harrison and Carrol (1991), 
who focus on the means through which culture is disseminated. A more revolutionary 
approach is also advocated (see Bowman and Falkner, 1997; Brown, 1995), 
encouraging a generalist approach to culture management through a use of taxonomy 
or typology of organisational culture (Harris and Obgonna, 2002). The picture is further 
confused due to the differing perspectives on culture change. Kondra and Hurst (2009) 
present compelling arguments for an institutional perspective on culture change in 
organisations. The limitations of the excellence literature have been highlighted earlier 
in the paper. Critical writers (see Martin, 1985; Obgonna, 1993) argue that culture is 
both complex and differentiated and any attempt to manipulate it might generate ethical 
issues and perverse consequences (Harrris and Obgonna, 2002, p. 34). That is also the 
view taken in this paper. 
Discussion of unintended consequences in the performance literature is well 
documented. The Minutes and Memoranda accompanying the Public Administration 
Select Committee Report (2003) contain a wealth of information about past attempts at 
performance measurement; including accounts of perverse behaviours which had been 
anticipated by practitioners but were ignored in their design. Bevan and Hood (2006) 
identify ‘reactive subversions’ (p. 521) in three of the targets in the English NHS. 
Wankhade (2011) documented a range of unintended consequences of the ambulance 
performance targets in the English NHS. Given the importance of recognising perverse 
consequences, empirical investigations of unanticipated consequences of culture 
management are surprisingly few. Understanding the unintended consequences of 
cultural intervention also has an implication for the organisational culture-performance 
debate referred to earlier. Unintended consequences of culture change initiatives could 
offer some explanation for the weak evidence of empirical relationship between 
performance and culture in the literature (Harris and Obgonna, 2002, p. 46).  
Harris and Obgonna (2002), identify the following unintended consequences in 
their study. 
 
 ‘Ritualisation’ of the culture change effort to an annual/periodic ritual; 
 ‘Hijacked process’ which results in the change of founding ideals of the change 
programme; 
 ‘Cultural erosion’ in which the espoused ideals are eroded by subsequent events; 
 ‘Cultural reinvention’ denoting espousal of attitudes and behaviours which, 
while appearing new, merely camouflage continued adherence to the old 
culture; 
 ‘Ivory tower’ cultural change reflecting cultural change plans which are either 
divorced from organisational reality or cannot produce meaningful 
implementation; 
 ‘Inattention to symbolism’ that is inherent in that organisation;  
 ‘Behavioural compliance’ with the long-term aim of changing the values, 
beliefs and assumptions of the employees who go through the emotions but their 
basic attitudes remain unchanged. 
 
 
Culture change management in the ambulance service 
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The desired purpose of such changes was the development of a ‘new' culture focussing 
on the direction of travel set out by national ambulance policy review (DH, 2005). 
Recommendations from the review required a quantum culture leap for the ambulance 
service in transforming itself from a simple transport organisation to a clinically driven 
emergency service. In addition, the review proposed major structural reorganisation of 
the ambulance service in the England which saw the merger of the thirty-three 
ambulance trusts into twelve in July 2006. This involved developing new management 
structures, development of a new culture of treating a greater number of patients in the 
community and performance of  an enhanced clinical role by the ambulance personnel 
(often referred in the ambulance jargon as the ‘see and treat’ as against the ‘scoop and 
run’ model). By implication, it also prepared the way for performance management to 
move beyond the stringent response time targets. 
Such culture change initiatives and the process of change during our study were 
also affected by various contextual factors. The understanding of the alignment between 
a culture and the wider environment is important if we are to make a realistic assessment 
of ‘cultural lag’ or ‘strategic drift’ (Scott et al., 2003b). There was growing recognition 
that the biggest facilitator for bringing cultural change to the ambulance service has 
been the recommendations contained in the national review: 
 
Whilst clinical and emergency planning roles are seen to require professional qualifications, 
management is often perceived as something that can be learned on the job. Leadership and 
organisational management expertise must receive an increased level of attention and 
investment if the ambulance service is to fulfil its potential (DH, 2005, p.11). 
 
       The national ambulance review built upon the previous efforts to modernise and 
professionalise ambulance service education (through paramedic degrees), regulation 
(Health professional Council) and streamlined performance management; thus 
presenting a ‘pivotal moment’ to the ambulance trusts in becoming a clinically 
professional service within the NHS. Despite the pressure of meeting more stringent 
response time targets, the issue of upgrading paramedic skills and clinical education 
was put in the spotlight for the ambulance service as a whole. A visit to the websites of 
many ambulance trusts revealed the emergence of a espoused new professional culture, 
with the increasing use of organisational change vocabulary such as vision, mission and 
value statements, business plans, etc.: notwithstanding the well-documented 
dysfunctional consequences from the restructuring of organisations (Fulop et al., 2002; 
Pollitt, 2007). The stated mission and values of the newly formed Delta trust included 
ensuring that patients received the most appropriate care, acknowledging the need for 
investment in fleet, on equipment and the workforce in building a truly modern and 
forward thinking healthcare service (Annual Report, 2007-08). There was a growing 
consensus that it gave ambulance trusts, which were small organisations historically, 
greater strategic capacity and capability to interact within the local health economy as 
a more equal partner. 
 Despite the efforts made by ambulance trusts to culturally transform themselves 
into a clinically driven workforce, they are still perceived as a uniformed service since 
the training and service provision have been organised around managing major trauma 
such as road traffic collision, severe breathing problems or cardiac arrest (Lendrum et 
al., 2000). Non-achievement of targets is still considered a taboo for senior executives.  
Vestiges of the old command and control culture, accompanied by tendency to blame 
(CHI, 2003) hierarchical and top-down management style, and resistance to change and 
being risk-averse (NHS Modernisation Agency, 2004) are some of the factors cited 
historically within ambulance service. It might be argued however that clinicians in 
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other parts of the NHS often complain that services are ‘hierarchical and top-down’ in 
management style, and ‘resistance to change’ is cited as a barrier in a variety of settings; 
so these issues are not unique to ambulance services. 
 
Research methodology  
This study was conducted by the first author in a large NHS ambulance trust in England 
(referred to here as the Delta trust to protect anonymity and confidentiality). This trust 
had been restructured in 2006 into one large organisation by merging four previous 
organisations, each with different organisational/management cultures and different 
performance histories (see table 1). The new trust structure consisted of three areas 
which coincided roughly with the geographical boundaries of the four legacy 
organisations, except that two old organisations were merged internally to form one 
new area. Each of the three areas was run by an area management team headed by an 
area director and had local responsibility and a loose operational accountability to the 
corporate executive team. 
 
Table 1: Background details of the restructured Delta Ambulance Trust 
 
Background 
Characteristics 
 
Trust I Trust II Trust III Trust IV 
Rural or Urban Urban 
 
Rural Rural Urban 
Approx. size of 
the area served 
 
550 Sq. 
Miles 
1,100 Sq. Miles 6,824 Sq. Miles 1,150 Sq. Miles 
 Resident 
Population  
 
2.3 Million 1.4 Million 492, 000 2.4 Million 
Staff strength 
(2004-05) 
 
1600 
 
1100 400 1100 
Number of calls 
received 
(2004-05) 
 
326, 939 142,000 33,149 274,900 
No. of incidents 
attended (2004-
05) 
 
245,921 112,183 34,879 220,000 
No. of patient 
journeys (PTS) 
 
763,838 245,000 229,652 621,000 
Cat. 8 minutes 
performance 
2004-05 (target 
75%) 
 
82.5 % 76.7 % 75 % 73.7 % 
Performance 
Ratings-2004-05 
3 Stars 3 Stars 1 Star 0 Stars 
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Performance 
Ratings-2003-04 
 
3 Stars 3 Stars 2 Stars 2 Stars 
         
        The main research question in this study was to explore the key objectives of the 
culture change initiative, documenting the perverse consequences of the culture change 
programme in the given organisation. Seventy two semi -structured interviews (see 
table 1) with 100 hours of non-participant observations during January 2007-June 2008 
informed the study findings.  
        Due to the exploratory nature of this study, the primary aim was to access the 
different experiences of a range of staff within the organisation in understanding their 
social settings (context) and their perception of culture change management. A 
‘stratified purposeful’ strategy (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p.28) was considered to be 
most effective method to recruit the participants in this study. The research participants 
included senior board executives, managers, and frontline staff representing 
paramedics, the 999 call handlers and dispatchers working in the Emergency Medical 
Dispatch Centres (EMDC) from all the three administrative areas of the Delta 
Ambulance Trust (see table 2). The selected sample helped to illustrate various sub-
groups within the organisation and facilitate understanding of the social dynamics 
underlying the case. The principal inclusion criterion of the research participants was 
based upon their professional role and their relevance to the aims of this study. To 
further improve the validity and reliability of the findings, policy experts from the 
Department of Health (DH) and Audit Commission were also interviewed. 
         Non-participant observations (see table 3) were conducted at three levels within 
the organisation: at the corporate level (trust headquarters); area management level 
(middle executives and managers level); and frontline paramedics and the EMDC staff 
(micro level). This allowed for an analysis of the interdependence between these 
organisational dimensions (Currie et al., 2008). At the corporate level, ten open Trust 
board meetings and internal executive meetings were observed. Four area management 
team meetings, to understand how these groups were responding to culture change 
initiatives, were also attended. At the micro-level of frontline staff, operations in the 
three EMDC control rooms were observed and time was also spent in the ambulance 
stations, travelling with ambulance crews and in the canteen where managers, junior 
executives, and frontline staff took breaks. In total, around 100 hours of observation 
inform this study. Observation was complemented with informal conversations in the 
‘corridors’ with staff. Conversations typically related to specific issues observed in 
meetings and discussion of the context that framed the decision on the matters (Currie 
et al., 2008).  
 
Table 2: Sampling Strategy for Recruitment of Research Participants 
 
First phase interviews (2007) 
Senior board executives (including non-execs) x 17 
Managers (including corporate & operational)  x 27 
Paramedics x 3 
EMDC (Control room staff) x 9 
Total interviews: 56  
Second phase interviews (2008)  
Senior board executives (including non-execs) x 6 
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Managers (corporate & operational) x 5 
EMDC (Control room staff) x 1 
Professional experts (including Ambulance Trust specialist, Audit Commission) x 4 
Total interviews: 16 
 
 
Table 3: Non-participant observation at Delta ambulance trust  
                      
Details of observation and time spent  
 
Executive and trust board meetings (including legacy trusts)  x 10 (41 hrs) 
Area Performance meetings (managerial) x 4 (11hrs) 
EMDC control room visits x 8 (18 hrs) 
Ambulance ride-ons & station visits x 6 (19 hrs) 
Canteen & small talk  (15 hrs)  
Total observation: 104 hrs   
 
          The evidence of these sources has been triangulated to build a rich understanding 
of the functioning of the performance framework in one ambulance trust in UK. Such 
an approach is in conformity with the use of multiple data collection strategies to build 
the in-depth case and improve the quality of the case study research (Currie et al., 2008; 
Miles and Huberman, 1994, Yin, 2003). 
 The interview data were transcribed and the responses to the key themes were 
analysed repeatedly to further explore the understandings of the culture and the impact 
of the culture change initiatives. Using the conceptual framework of Harris and 
Obgonna (2002), the interview analysis informed by observation, helped to highlight 
prominent and emergent issues which provided a framework for interpretation of the 
data (Rhodes and Brown, 2005) and content analysis (Boje, 1991; Sayer, 2000; Watson, 
2011; Charmaz, 2003). Quotations have been used from the analysis of the interviews 
unless explicitly attributed to the observation data. Ethical approval for the study was 
obtained from the local NHS research ethics committee.  
 
Findings and results  
Employees of the Delta trust were exposed to the cultural change initiative that was 
championed by a senior and experienced member of the executive management team. 
There was no formal internal document/paper within the organisation but interviews 
with senior executives revealed four key objectives of the culture change programme 
in the organisation. They included: 
 
1. Developing a more clinically trained workforce by providing clinical leadership 
and governance aligned to the challenges imposed by Taking Healthcare to the 
Patient (DH, 2005); 
2. Changing the overall attitude and behavioural characteristics of the staff in 
helping them to engage in evidence based practice; 
3. Improving the staff-management relationships in the new organisation to 
address the concerns of the legacy organisations and staff welfare; and  
4. Addressing the current value and beliefs in the organisation to raise the overall 
profile of the service within the wider NHS. 
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         In dealing with these objectives, senior executives largely viewed this as 
comprising changes to staff values and behaviours in the light of the challenge posed 
by the national ambulance review (DH, 2005): 
          
Setting up the medical directorate around clinical performance indicators is perhaps 
one of the areas which excite me most about being the unfulfilled potential of the 
ambulance service around its performance area (Senior Board Executive I). 
 
If you talk to road staff about achieving Category A performance they just laugh in 
the sense of well that’s your problem and it’s your problem to get the ambulances in 
the right place, to make sure we can get there within the time and what hasn’t 
happened is the staff. I am not saying they are to blame for this at all, it’s partly down 
to the way the organisations and managers have not necessarily communicated it 
very well, but what the staff don’t take on board is that the Category A 8-minute 
standard is actually reflective of patient care (Senior Board Executive II). 
 
And one of the things my top team will be talking about at the moment as we sit here, 
is about how we identify what is good clinical care in a remote rural area, what’s 
good clinical care in a rural area, what’s good clinical care in an urban area and how 
we put together the performance framework clinically which ensures that the 
clinicians understand where they are in terms of the patch and what is good clinical 
care where they are.  (Senior Board Executive III). 
 
          A number of techniques were employed by the senior management team to this 
effect. Such methods included series of meetings with all staff in all the three areas of 
the trust; attendance at ‘visions and values’ workshops; using the staff intranet to 
promote and publicise the organisation’s vision and values statement; communication 
of espoused beliefs during visits by senior managers; symbolic gestures and actions etc. 
The desired purpose of the change was the development of culture and was focussed on 
the direction set out by the government. The strategy for cultural integration 
adopted by the trust management was designed to change the accountability lines for 
the area heads directly back to the executive directors. Senior executives argued that it 
was necessary to set up the new trust with some geographical continuity from the old 
organisations, so as to ensure the service was delivered without any interruption until 
the new organisational structures were put in place. To further strengthen corporate 
accountability, many area managers were given additional corporate responsibilities 
and were required to divide their time between the corporate headquarters and their 
respective local areas. Senior members of the executive team were quick to point out 
the signs of change and how the things were going in the right direction. 
 
Yes I can see signs. We've got senior managers and some middle managers who are 
beginning to act in a way that we would expect within the new culture. We've got 
members of staff and members of the trade unions who are at least now talking the 
language and are debating and discussing the points. There are signs that people even 
if they don’t agree or accept them, at least understand and acknowledge where we’re 
trying to go (Senior Board Executive IV). 
 
      Initial interviews with frontline staff including managers revealed some 
differences with the desired objectives and change strategies. There was a lack of 
consensus on issues involving management and clinical practices. There was also a 
perceived grievance about the style and pace of culture change programme 
undertaken: 
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 We’ve now got to consider the whole area and we’ve now been basically told 
clinically this is what your performance measure should be and what we’re 
measuring against and I don’t necessarily think that that is the best way of doing it. 
I still think that there’s quite a lot of this corporate central urban view that seems to 
be pushed out to everywhere else that I don’t think’s always appropriate (Senior 
Manager, Erstwhile Trust II, May 2007).  
 
And later: 
 
I don’t think culturally we've changed at all, apart from maybe what we’re saying 
there's maybe a little bit of an understanding there that we've got to believe in what 
we’re saying now where I think there's less negativity there before, so culturally 
that may be changing but I think we’re a long way from changing fundamentally. 
(Senior Manager, Erstwhile Trust II, June 2008).  
 
 
Senior managers and experienced staff raised issues of symbolic importance: 
 
I see that we meet with the commissioners on a regular basis and since we've become 
NWAS in this area, this year, we funded over £6½ m of additional funding and we 
saw just over £2m of that and we haven’t even seen the return for that yet because 
having been given the £6½ m in March/April time this year nobody allowed us to 
spend it (Manager, Erstwhile Trust IV, December 2007). 
 
There was also no unanimity in respect to improving the clinical training and 
governance mechanism which was one of the stated objectives of the culture change 
programme. Staff raised variance in practise across the new organisation: 
 
I think that there are some frustrations amongst the paramedics sometimes that they 
feel that they are deployed inappropriately for they say that the training is in some 
way not reflective in way they are asked to do (Senior Area Executive). 
 
I think staff is finding it hard to understand the transition from trade to profession. 
They don’t realise that some of the practices they perhaps got away in the past, they 
can actually be under an enquiry from the Professional Council for some of these 
practices (Senior Manager I). 
 
           Our study revealed that many of the cultural change objectives cited in the 
beginning of this section have not been fully achieved. The culture change interventions 
identified in our study appeared to be ‘top-down,’ ‘invasionary’ in approach, with a 
very hierarchical understanding of how change has to be managed (Diefenbach, 2007, 
p. 130; Clegg and Walsh, 2004). Furthermore, the desired changes were undermined by 
perverse consequences that were accepted by the respondents as having slowed or even 
halted the change programme. Some of these effects, discussed later in the paper, could 
well be due to lack of understanding of the distinct occupational sub-cultures within the 
ambulance service and their different assumptions on issues relating to organisational 
performance and culture (see Wankhade, 2012 for details). 
 Acknowledging that no change programme can be perfect, it is equally 
important to document any dysfunctional behaviour arising out of such programmes, 
so as to minimise the effect of such unintended consequences for the organisation. 
Using the conceptual model developed by Harris and Obgonna (2002), six unintended 
consequences of culture management have been documented which are based upon the 
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four stated culture change initiatives observed during the study and are dealt with at 
some length, as follows:  
 
Hijacked process 
The first issue relates to the extent to which the founding ideals of the change 
programme were maintained throughout the process of change. The unintended effect 
of the change centres on the creation of an opportunity to hijack the process of change. 
The change initiatives began with relatively clear aims and objectives: 
 
I think that high investment in clinical leadership and management is going to be the 
most important thing that we can do to deliver good performance (Senior Board 
Executive I, January 2007).  
 
But later: 
 
My biggest challenge is really continuing to keep clinical leadership and 
management at the top of the agenda. This is because it’s going to require effort from 
the managers; it’s going to require change and it’s going to require money and none 
of those things have been mandated by political or local targets (Senior Board 
Executive I, December 2007).  
 
Recent evidence (Wankhade, 2011; Radcliffe and Heath, 2009) suggests that the issue 
of clinical education and workforce training in the ambulance service in the UK has 
been hijacked, to an extent, by the operational exigencies of meeting performance 
targets. This pertains to the first objectives of the culture change programme discussed 
earlier in this section. This hypothesis is confirmed by the views expressed by many 
participants that training and staff development were sacrificed and staff were re-
deployed to meet performance targets. The need for a stronger clinical leadership was 
identified as one of the key recommendations in a recent report published by the 
Association of Ambulance Chief Executives (AACE, 2011, p.76). 
 
The impact of such interference was either the subversion or camouflaging of the 
process. As a result the original aims were either lost or downgraded (Harris and 
Obgonna, 2002, p. 39): 
 
If I’m honest, everyone says training is very important and everyone probably does 
think it very important.  In practice it’s sacrificed to meet targets and we’ve done that 
here. So, unfortunately, training is one of the first sacrificial lambs when it comes to 
meeting targets… Convincing colleagues is more difficult. Training staff is easy 
(Senior Training Manager).  
 
Thus this important facet of the cultural change programme can be subject to the 
vagaries of operational exigencies, the rationale of which can often be couched in 
organisational efficiency jargon.  
 
Cultural erosion 
The second management action resulting in unintended effects centred on the extent to 
which the espoused ideals were eroded by subsequent events. In some cases, indications 
are found of seemingly successful changes in employee behaviour and values in the 
short term, but such behaviour tended not to persist (Harris and Obgonna, 2002). One 
of the stated objectives for cultural change was to culturally integrate the four legacy 
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organisations into the new organisation. However, there were signs that other factors 
were impinging on the change: 
 
A lot of that happened in the first few months when the chief and other executives 
were everywhere and I think we've probably covered it too much then and not enough 
now. I think when he’s out and about, people warm to him, and he can easily explain 
things that people will accept (Senior Executive Erstwhile Trust I). 
 
Well most of the senior executives have shown their face, but they don’t get out and 
see the staff when they come to this building. It’s not about coming to HQ and going 
into control and talking to the control staff. It’s being seen out and about so the staff 
get the understanding and the belief that they’ve got a team (Senior Manager II 
Erstwhile Trust IV). 
 
In another example of cultural erosion, it was seen that strengthening the clinical 
governance capability was also part of the change management programme, but that 
with the passage of time, management attention was diverted by other equally powerful 
forces: 
 
I think it’s a good opportunity to start afresh… We will bring in a much stronger 
clinical management structure at an operational level.  I will now have the structure 
to push clinical governance forwards right down to patient level (Clinical 
Governance Manager, March 2007).  
 
But later: 
 
The lack of clinical governance is still there. There is a clear divide between 
operational management versus clinical direction. The organisation is still run very 
operationally (Clinical Governance Manager, June 2008).  
 
In both cases, early changes in line with the official position of increasing the visibility 
of the senior management team in all areas and of improving the clinical governance 
structures in the new trust were eroded. Such erosion appeared to be linked to the extent 
to which the desired change is reinforced and rewarded as well as the degree to which 
behaviours and values are aligned (Harris and Obgonna, 2002, p. 40). This relates to 
the second objective discussed at the beginning of this section. 
 
Ivory tower culture change 
Unintended consequences also emerge when cultural change initiatives are designed 
without sufficient awareness of the diversity of views throughout the organisation. One 
of the stated objectives of the cultural change programme was to upgrade clinical skills 
and the knowledge of the workforce so that they felt sufficiently confident to make 
clinical decisions at the scene of emergency: 
 
It’s not easy to get the individual to understand what the organisation is about and what 
their roles are. When you are saying to someone, who may have been working in a 
factory making a widget, but now is actually going to go out there and save someone’s 
life and meet them at the most vulnerable point in their lives. It’s a stark reality 
(Training Manager). 
 
It appeared that the development of the cultural change plans did not take the 
organisational reality into account or were incapable of meaningful implementation. 
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Thus the individuals and groups involved in the planning of the cultural change 
programme were not fully aware of ‘ground realities’ ranging from educational and 
motivational levels through to practices and procedures (Harris and Obgonna, 2002). It 
was assumed a majority of the staff would be keen to accept the new challenge 
envisaged by the policy makers. The unintended consequences of the change 
programme varied with the individuals and the scale of challenge involved in making 
the ‘leap’. For example, two respondents from different occupational groups in the new 
organisation raised doubts about such high ideals: 
 
We have made paramedics professionals, but that was just a piece of legislation that 
was passed that protected the title. Historically it’s a blue collar service. It’s been run 
similar to the police and fire service – very operationally – and it’s about bringing 
that clinical focus back in to run it as a clinical service as opposed to an operational 
one. But you’ve got a huge workforce there that is set in their ways (Senior Area 
Executive II).  
 
They don’t care at the end of the day what those figures say… No they don’t really 
give a monkey because the minute they come here for a 12 hour shift, whether it be 
a day shift or a night shift it’s job, after job, after job (Senior Paramedic I). 
 
The impact of this unintended side-effect of change is that clinical educational and 
training of the workforce still remains a big cultural challenge for the ambulance service 
in the UK (Siriwardena, 2010; Snooks et al., 2009). Observations of staff suggest that 
while the organisation is moving ahead with the clinical training of the workforce, it 
doesn’t necessarily register across the organisation and the canteen culture still plays 
its part. Thus it is important to involve all members of staff in some level of consultation 
and organisational analysis prior to the change management process. As such the 
cultural intervention effort studied in this case remained painfully distant to the desired 
objectives two and three as discussed earlier. 
 
Inattention to symbolism 
A few of the managers and staff interviewed during this study spoke about lack of 
management understanding of the concerns of other sub-cultures and also their 
contribution towards the success of the organisation. This relates to the third objective 
stated earlier in this section. But despite the challenges in developing a new culture, 
there were a few positive signs emerging in that respect:  
 
I think it is a power issue. They don’t seem to accept that there are four services here 
that have four different ways of working and theirs might not be the best way of 
looking at things (Senior Manager III Erstwhile Trust I, May 2007).  
 
But later: 
 
I think what has been quite good is the way that the recognition by the trust that 
things maybe haven’t gone as well as they expected. From my point of view there 
seems to be a little bit of recognition. I think there's a lot more understanding out 
there and people do seem to be making more of an effort now and that's good because 
that has eased this corporate area off a bit as well (Senior Manager III Erstwhile Trust 
I, June 2008). 
 
In contrast, a few of the frontline staff, including the paramedics and EMDC control 
room staff, frankly admitted their lack of awareness of the changes being carried out 
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and how they were not bothered about them either. This might not be too surprising 
(see Willmott, 1996; Beer et al., 1996). One dispatcher argued that he wanted to see 
real changes and the organisation had not made enough progress on issues like 
uniforms, vehicles, stations, equipment, working practices and career development. But 
not everyone agreed with this assessment and a few participants were rather dismissive 
of these concerns: 
 
The issues that they whinge about is exactly what they’ve always whinged about 
which is new vehicles, new equipment, and at the moment, well what are they 
changing now? Are they going to take this off us or whatever and that's always the 
same. I don’t think from a staff perception, apart from the upheaval that they see, the 
day to day work hasn’t changed at all (Senior Corporate Manager I). 
 
Another factor which was peculiar to the given case and having a bearing on the 
cultural integration in our study was the impact of the merger on different staff. One 
specific issue referred to by many participants was the ‘power issue’ in which 
executives and senior managers of one particular legacy organisation were 
appointed (although after due process of selection) to the new trust. Discussions on 
outcomes of such power relationships and struggle for supremacy are well 
documented in the literature (Diefenbach, 2007, p. 135; Walsh, 1995, Humphrey, 
2005; Grant et al., 2005). Some respondents who previously worked in the other 
three legacy trusts referred to the management structure of the Delta Ambulance 
Trust as an ‘Area I takeover’ and felt that all the good things achieved by them 
earlier were lost: 
 
Perception of most of the lads here in this area is that it’s an Area I takeover. People 
in higher jobs are from Area I. None of our senior managers have been given a job. 
At the grass root, they think that they have not integrated with Area I, but been taken 
over. It’s 4-0 when we checked last time when four jobs were lost to Area I (Senior 
Station Manager, Area II).  
 
Another factor which gave some credence to the power issue referred to earlier was the 
perception of some members of staff that the operational practices, reporting systems 
and drug protocols followed by the new organisation were largely adapted from the 
practices followed by the former trust now representing Area I. Thus, by implication, 
evidence of good practice existing in the then legacy organisations was perceived to be 
ignored: 
 
We've got some excellent reporting systems here in terms of performance 
management, better than any of the other areas. When you speak to a couple of 
assistant directors and executive directors they accept that the reporting systems are 
better here than anywhere in the (Delta) trust and yet they don’t seem to get adopted 
by the trust. They want us to try and use the Area I model which is flawed and is 
proven to be flawed at the moment (Senior Manager IV, Area II). 
 
We noticed some further evidence about lack of attention to symbolism during the 
change management process. Pondy et al. (1983) observe that symbols are key 
components of culture but often get ignored by practitioners, who concentrate only on 
the layers of culture and miss this important aspect in culture change programmes. 
Discussions with paramedics and other frontline staff showed how passionate they were 
about their working conditions and how they valued the facilities made available to 
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them. They were quick to compare how things had changed between their original 
organisations when compared with their new organisations: 
 
When you consider what matters to operational staff, they want to ensure that they’ve 
got quality vehicles, quality equipment, that they get regular meal breaks and receive 
a reasonable remuneration for what they do and they’re well trained. Now if you 
crack those few things off you've got a fairly satisfied workforce. We've put in no 
new vehicles, hardly any staff, which has led to extra pressures on existing staff 
(Senior Area Manager V). 
 
The impact of these symbolic actions during change also appeared to have a profound 
impact on the change process. In particular, for those areas in the Delta trust where the 
procurement of new vehicles was delayed, it took on a symbolic meaning. Views were 
quickly disseminated through informal channels of communication and respondents 
pointed out how such things were dealt with much faster previously. Many individuals 
started to question the benefits of the restructuring. This is not to suggest that the 
management team showed any discrimination in making new vehicles available to a 
particular area. However in the new, bigger organisation, such decisions were based on 
balancing the needs of all the three areas subject to financial resources being available. 
This obviously meant a certain time-lag in the actual delivery of the vehicles. 
Nonetheless, it remained a rather emotive issue for frontline staff impacting the 
relations between staff and senior management. As summed by one participant: 
 
We see non-core activity being ruled down to help to balance the operational resource. 
What matters is delivering the bottom line performance target. So we might get there 
very quickly but will do so in a kind of poor vehicle, poorly trained and poorly 
motivated staff that would have negative impact on the organisation (Senior Area 
Executive II). 
 
It thus appears that attempts to bring cultural change in ambulance trusts will need to 
consider cultural sensitivities of different subcultures within the organisation 
(Wankhade, 2012). Without the appreciation of this ‘symbol dilemma’ (Harris and 
Obgonna, 2002), such an intervention programme may not meet with the expected 
success. Further research on this issue may improve our understanding of cultural 
strength and may be helpful in explaining the management of culture in different 
contexts. A meaningful staff engagement programme was further highlighted in the 
recent report cited earlier (AACE, 2011) which acknowledged the progress made in the 
areas of education and training but highlighted the need to engage with the workforce 
that “by and large feels undervalued and wants more support” (ibid, p. 76). 
 
 
 
Ritualisation of culture change  
Few of the managers sounded supportive of the concerns of the frontline staff and spoke 
of different challenges due to moving to the new, centred approach. Issues relating to 
increased workload, delays in decision-making, lack of new vehicles, absence of 
direction from the centre, and non-availability of senior executives in the areas, were 
some of the things mentioned in this regard in relation to the third stated objective of 
the culture change initiative: 
 
I haven’t up to now seen a great deal of encouraging signs that things are really 
moving on and improving. I'm normally one of those people who will say, “Well 
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look, you know these things take time to settle down guys, give it time and be 
reasonable.” A lot of my colleagues just think it’s awful, absolutely awful, but it is 
sometimes difficult to stay out of their negative views because there hasn’t been a 
great deal to shout about (Senior Area Manager VI). 
 
Some support of the views expressed by the manager above came from a junior 
executive who called for greater visibility of the senior executives and talked about 
tensions between local practices and the corporate centre: 
 
I think it’s a horrible feeling that this is a faceless organisation and that the people 
who are making decisions clinically and making some quite unpopular decisions are 
never around to speak to (Senior Area Executive III). 
 
Some respondents blamed poor communications in the new bigger organisation for not 
getting the right message across. Communication in the chosen organisation was a 
function of the Corporate Communication team, the head of which worked directly 
under the chief executive but without a vote in the trust board: 
 
I think we’re made some bad mistakes over the last few months with things that 
should have been quite smooth and should have been seen as benefits to staff or to 
patients. The way it’s been communicated has basically turned that upon its head 
(Senior Communication Manager). 
 
However some participants highlighted peculiarities of the ambulance culture and how 
it impacts on any cultural change programme: 
 
I don’t think it really matters whether you live in area I or II or III; there are different 
variations on culture but it is still an ambulance culture.  I am being realistic and it is 
very unionized making it much more difficult to make changes (Senior Corporate 
Manager II). 
 
One expert agreed to the above assessment of the Delta ambulance trust staff 
 
There have been a lot of arguments, national appeals about meal breaks, grading and 
things like that, but it has revealed, I think, something more fundamental.  There is a 
certain conservatism, a certain unwillingness to change. You can’t push anybody to 
be flexible and adaptable so far. Sooner or later they step back to what they are 
familiar with (Ambulance trust specialist, Audit Commission). 
 
Senior executives were quick to dispel this perception on the part of some of the staff 
and emphasised that only the best people were appointed in the new organisation, with 
merit being the sole criterion for their appointment. The exact truth may be difficult to 
ascertain and some of it can be traced to the vagaries of human nature and the 
individual’s role in the new organisation. Interestingly, performance in Area I started 
to dip whilst other areas tried to catch up during the first seven months of 2008. In its 
own peculiar way this factor helped to ease out some of those feelings. One executive 
summed it up quite well: 
 
I think there’s been some interesting dynamics being developed because of what was 
seen as an Area I takeover. I think it is still being viewed as that in big chunks of the 
organisation. But increasingly we’re seeing people from other areas say well actually 
we are better than that (Senior Area Executive, Area III). 
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Our study revealed that employee response to change differed widely, depending on the 
enthusiasm of individuals to participate in or implement espoused changes and the 
strength of the existing subcultures to which they belonged (Sackman, 2002; 
Wankhade, 2012) thus impacting the staff-management relationships. Assumptions of 
the subcultures were also guided by the functional groupings, trade union membership 
(a real issue for the ambulance service), length and terms of working in the service, 
individual loss/gain due to restructuring or a combination of all these issues. Evidence 
presented here suggests the potential impact of the strength of each sub-culture as a 
crucial factor in changing the culture in the ambulance service. This is supported in the 
literature as one of the reasons for the failure of organisational change initiatives (see 
Sathe, 1983, who describes it as ‘thickness’; and Schall, 1983, who refers to strength as 
‘congruence’).  
 
Behavioural compliance 
The final unintended outcome documented in our study is related to behavioural 
compliance in relation to the fourth stated objective mentioned earlier in this section.  
Harris and Obgonna (2002) note that many culture interventions fail in their objective 
of value change but do influence the behaviours of organisational members. In our 
study, the designers of the change were quite explicit in their long-term aim of changing 
the values, opinions and beliefs of the employees. For instance: 
  
We don’t want to merge the four previous cultures into the new one; we want to 
create a whole new culture that actually doesn’t take on any of the baggage from the 
four previous ones (Senior Board Executive IV).  
 
I think what we actually need to do is we need a take a non-professional blue collar 
workforce and migrate it into being a professional workforce (Senior Board 
Executive V). 
 
Mixed evidence was reported in the study as to whether real managed value change 
emerged. This is not to suggest that beliefs and values remained constant or there was 
no impact of the efforts to bring about culture change. It appeared though that any 
observed change in values was evolutionary rather than the result of management 
initiative. On the surface, it would appear that senior managers were quite optimistic 
about change: 
 
We are now in that stage and we have to move to the next level making that change 
happen (Senior Area Executive IV). 
 
But interviews with frontline staff revealed a somewhat different viewpoint. Concerns 
were expressed about tensions arising due to uncertainty and confusion regarding 
structures and roles; the corporate centre versus local identity issue; the challenge of 
convincing staff that this was a merger and not a takeover; and the recognition that 
corporate challenge exists rather than pretending it does not. But there was also a 
growing recognition, especially during the second year of the new trust that things 
needed to be done differently in light of the policy initiatives and the management 
response towards such changes. Some respondents agreed a change was warranted: 
 
 Those of who I would have classed as disinterested have taken an interest and have 
suggested, “Oh we’ll have a go at that because that's the future. That's the way we want 
to go (Senior paramedic II). 
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 We are accepting that we have to do things differently…You know when you get your 
head around it and you think, ‘Yeah okay’ then I accept that I've had to change as well 
(Senior Area Manager VII).  
 
Behaviour compliance is a well-documented phenomenon in the literature (Legge, 
1994; Obgonna and Wilkinson, 1990). Our evidence suggests that the unintended 
effects of behavioural compliance by staff can overshadow the expectations of value 
change during a culture change programme. A mixed picture thus emerged about the 
impact of the fourth change objective, varying with the levels of individual engagement, 
length of service, prior contact with the senior management team and impact on 
individual roles. 
 
Discussion and analysis  
It is worth emphasizing the context of the study, that a change in culture was sought at 
a time of major reorganisation involving merger of four trusts into one, and is a critical 
factor in the negative consequences described in this study. 
           Since their re-organisation in 2006, NHS ambulance trusts in England are 
witnessing a process of culture change in the light of the new direction of travel 
envisaged by policy makers (NHS Confederation, 2008; National Audit Office, 2010). 
The increasing importance given by the government to bringing cultural change to the 
NHS shows the relevance of the evidence presented in this paper, highlighting some of 
the issues concerning cultural change in one large ambulance trust in England. Findings 
discussed in this paper bring empirical evidence from a systematic exploration and 
description of a range of perverse and unintended consequences of culture initiatives in 
an emergency health service in the UK, helping to address a clear research gap. The 
difficulties in conceptualizing culture change have been discussed earlier in the paper. 
Our study has documented several perverse consequences of the culture change 
objectives in a large ambulance trust in England. These findings shed additional light 
on the ongoing debates about culture interventions being seen as a “continuum” in 
which the extent of planned change is gauged in different shades rather than in 
definitive terms (Harris and Obgonna, 2002, p. 45; Alvesson, 2002). These findings 
have brought out the impact of the cultural interventions not only on the frontline staff, 
but also on the managers who were subjected to change and who are also prone to 
unpredictable consequences – a theme we identify as currently ‘under-studied’ 
(Balogun and Johnson, 2004). 
A central implication from these findings is that any meaningful evaluation of 
culture change initiatives (like the success of the performance framework) should be 
considered not only in relation to the achievement of pre-planned objectives but also by 
dysfunctional effects of such change initiatives. These findings have further 
implications for the organisational ‘culture-performance’ debate, which is relevant for 
understanding the link between organisational performance and organisational culture 
(Mannion et al., 2005). The weakness of the empirical evidence suggesting links 
between the two has been raised before. Harris and Obgonna (2002, p. 46) argue that 
“where evidence of a culture-performance link is found, it seems likely that either the 
unexpected effects of culture change were positive or that the negative effects were 
negligible or minimized by astute management. Where no link is found, the moderating 
effect of negative unintended consequences is likely to have been especially profound.” 
We tend to support this hypothesis.  
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It is worthwhile noting some of the limitations of this analysis. We do not intend 
to generalise these case study findings. Though Eisenhardt’s (1989) view is that more 
than four cases are desirable, Dyer and Wilkins (1991) cite some of the more important 
single case studies that have advanced the knowledge of organisations. Thus we provide 
a thick description of the settings, so that readers are better able to assess how well our 
findings may apply in other contexts (Wilkins, 1984; Lincon and Guba, 1985). 
 The importance of timing is crucial in studies of organisational culture. 
Although this study was carried out over a period of two years, it is emphasised that 
any culture change is a dynamic process and it could have different effects over time 
(Jackson, 1997). Another limitation of these findings relates to the diversity of existing 
perspectives on culture change (Pettigrew et al., 2001). Any finding of no culture 
change could be an artefact or overemphasis on pervasive side effects, whilst any 
evidence of culture change can be attributed to the actual experience of the participants 
(and researchers) of weak unintended effects (Harris and Obgonna, 2002). Further 
research into the perverse (and unintended) consequences of culture change initiatives 
in different ambulance settings will uncover additional insights into the nature and 
dynamics of these changes.  
 
Conclusion  
We have argued in this paper that existing and past efforts on the part of the ambulance 
service to fully integrate within the wider NHS have been hindered by the confusion 
which still prevails within its members about the core value and mission of the service 
(NHS Confederation, 2011, 2011a). Being part of the NHS, ambulance services have 
made a huge progress towards their transformation from a patient transport organisation 
to a clinically trained workforce in the last ten years (NAO, 2010; DH, 2005). The 
historical perception of judging them as a health arm of the emergency services as 
opposed to the emergency arm of the health service has changed considerably but the 
need to create organisations that ‘look, feel, behave and deliver differently’ is still being 
debated by the ambulance chiefs (AACE, 2011, p. 77). Issues surrounding the cultural 
transformation of the service into a professional clinical workforce form an ongoing 
agenda for current debates (Cooke, 2011; Wankhade, 2011a).  
 There are several policy and practice implications from this study. One central 
implication from our findings is that any meaningful evaluation of culture change 
initiatives should be seen not only in relation to the success of the planned objectives, 
but also registering the perverse consequences of culture change programmes. Thus, it 
would be important to have meaningful results for efforts to bring about cultural change 
along with structural and procedural reforms. There is a case for a systematic 
identification and evaluation of such effects during the planning stage, as well as during 
and after the culture change initiatives by individual organisations (Hatch, 1993). Given 
the profound nature of these perverse consequences, it would be useful for the 
organisation to develop realistic expectations regarding the consequences of cultural 
change. The evidence cited in the paper is specific to an English ambulance setting but 
there is a value in the lesson drawn from this study for future attempts at culture change 
in other ambulance trusts and potentially other healthcare organisations including 
international settings. Further research will be valuable to test the generalisability of 
these findings.  
We thus argue that any worthwhile study of organisational culture change 
management must take into account the perverse consequences of such a process, the 
preparation and implementation experience along with its overall impact on the 
employees. Within complex and dynamic environments such as the NHS, issues 
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pertaining to performance measurement might also be better understood with reference 
to organisational sub-cultures (Wankhade, 2012). By examining and observing the 
diverse and often conflicting cultural perceptions, values and practices of different sub-
cultures in a given organisation, implications for culture change initiatives can also be 
considered. In conclusion we agree with Alvesson (2002, p. 186) that “culture change 
calls for receptiveness amongst the collective for new ideas, values and meaning and 
without such an openness, radical, intentional cultural change is very difficult.” 
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